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Abstract
Deep convolutional neural networks have been shown to
be vulnerable to arbitrary geometric transformations. How-
ever, there is no systematic method to measure the invari-
ance properties of deep networks to such transformations.
We propose ManiFool as a simple yet scalable algorithm
to measure the invariance of deep networks. In particular,
our algorithm measures the robustness of deep networks to
geometric transformations in a worst-case regime as they
can be problematic for sensitive applications. Our exten-
sive experimental results show that ManiFool can be used to
measure the invariance of fairly complex networks on high
dimensional datasets and these values can be used for ana-
lyzing the reasons for it. Furthermore, we build on Manifool
to propose a new adversarial training scheme and we show
its effectiveness on improving the invariance properties of
deep neural networks.1
1. Introduction
Although convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have
been largely successful in various applications, they have
been shown to be quite vulnerable to additive adversarial
perturbations [25, 10, 18] which can negatively affect their
applicability in sensitive applications such as autonomous
driving [6]. Deep networks have also been shown to be vul-
nerable to rigid geometric transformations [7, 9], which are
more natural than additive perturbations: they can simply
represent the change of the viewpoint of an image. There-
fore, invariance to such transformations is certainly a key
feature in practical vision systems. In this paper, we focus
on studying the robustness of deep networks to geometric
transformations in the worst-case regime as these can be
quite problematic for sensitive applications. We approach
this problem by searching for minimal ’fooling’ transforma-
tions, i.e., transformations that change the decision of image
classifiers, and we use these transformed examples to mea-
sure the invariance of a deep network. We further show that
1To encourage reproducible research, the code of our method will be
later published.
Figure 1: An example of a worst-case ’fooling’ affine transform
for AlexNet [15]. While the image on top is correctly classified
as sorrel (a type of horse), a small transformation in the bottom
image can cause it to be classified as basset (a type of dog), even
though the change in the image is imperceptible.
fine-tuning on such worst-case transformed examples can
improve the invariance properties of deep image classifiers.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We propose a scalable algorithm, ManiFool, for find-
ing small worst-case transformations and define a mea-
sure to compare the invariance properties of different
networks.
• As far as we know, we perform the first quantitative
study on the robustness of deep networks to geomet-
ric transformations that are trained on a large scale
dataset, i.e., ImageNet, and show that these networks
are susceptible to small and sometimes imperceptible
transformations.
• We use the ManiFool algorithm to perform adversar-
ial training using geometric transformations and show
that it actually improves the invariance of deep net-
works.
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The adversarial examples are first introduced in [25]. Since
then, many methods to find additive adversarial perturba-
tions have been proposed such as [18, 10, 4]. Other types
of adversarial examples are later found in [3, 20]. The work
[25] also introduces the concept of adversarial training to
increase the accuracy of networks. The authors in [10] later
show that adversarial training can also be used for increas-
ing the robustness of networks against adversarial examples
constructed by additive perturbations.
The vulnerability of CNNs against geometric transfor-
mations, on the other hand, has been studied in [17] and [24]
that analyze image and visual representations to find theo-
retical foundations of transformation invariant features. The
work in [2] uses the information about human visual system
to understand and improve the transformation invariance. In
addition, several practical solutions have been suggested for
improving the invariance characteristics. One approach is to
modify the layers of the networks; e.g., pooling layer[5] or
convolutional layers [22]. Another method is to add mod-
ules to the network, like the spatial transformer networks
[12]. Even though these works focus on improving the in-
variance, they do not offer methods for measuring invari-
ance properties of classification architectures. This problem
is the main focus of [9], where the invariance is measured by
using the firing rates of neurons in the network for one di-
mensional transformations. On the other hand, the authors
of [8] propose a probabilistic framework for estimating the
robustness of a classifier by using a Metropolis algorithm to
sample the set of transformations. Lastly, another approach
is given by Manitest [7], where the invariance is measured
using the geodesic distances on the manifold of transformed
images. In this work, we also use a manifold-based defini-
tion of invariance and propose a new scalable algorithm for
evaluating invariance in more complex networks and im-
proving it by fine-tuning.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the mathematical
tools that we will use to measure the robustness of deep
networks to geometric transformations.
Let T be a Lie group of geometric transformations such
as rotations or projective transformations. Then, let τ ∈ T
be a function τ : R2 → R2 in this group. For 2D images, τ
can be seen as a bijection that maps the points of an image
to the points of another image. More precisely, let an image
I be defined as a square integrable function I : R2 → R.
The action of τ on I can be represented as Iτ (x, y). This
can also be seen as a function that maps the Lie group T to
the image space, which we denote by ψ(I)(τ) : T → L2,
where L2 is the space of square integrable functions. A
transformation τ can be represented by as many parameters
as the dimensionality of T . For example, the rotation angle
can be used to parameterize the rotation group. These pa-
rameters can be grouped in a vector θ, where each element
represents one of the parameters of τ .
For a given Lie group T , we need to define a metric
d(τ1, τ2) : T ×T → R to measure the actual effect of
transformations on images. A naive metric would consist in
measuring the `2 distance between the parameter vectors of
τ1 and τ2. This however is not a useful metric since it does
not take into account the different nature of the transforma-
tion parameters such as rotation angle or scale. The metric
should rather depend on the image as well as the transfor-
mations. However, another metric such as the squared L2
distance dI(τ1, τ2) = ‖Iτ1 − Iτ2‖2L2 still does not fully cap-
ture the properties of the transformation even if it depends
on the image(see [7] for an illustrative example). Thus, a
better metric should be able to capture the intrinsic geomet-
ric structure of the transformed images.
One such metric is to the length of the shortest curve
between τ1, τ2 ∈ T , i.e., the geodesic distance. This met-
ric, however, requires a Riemannian metric to be defined for
T . In this case, the Riemannian metric can be acquired by
mapping T to the set of transformed versions of image I ,
i.e.,M(I) = {Iτ : τ ∈ T }. This set forms a differentiable
manifold called the image appearance manifold (IAM) fol-
lowing the works of [27, 13] and it inherits a Riemannian
metric from its ambient space, L2. From [7], it can be seen
that the Riemannian metric on T can be chosen accordingly,
such that the length of a curve on T , γ(t) : [0, 1] → T ,
will be equal to the length of the mapped curve onM(I),
Iγ(t) : [0, 1] → M(I). Thus, the geodesic distance be-
tween τ1, τ2 ∈ T is equal to the geodesic distance between
Iτ1 , Iτ2 ∈ M(I). Then, for τ1, τ2 ∈ T , the transformation
metric can be finally defined as
dI(τ1, τ2) = min
γ:[0,1]→M(I)
L(γ)
s.t. γ(0) = Iτ1 , γ(1) = Iτ2 ,
(1)
where L(γ) is the length of the curve γ. This metric both
depends on the transformed image and also takes into ac-
count the geometric properties of the transformation set T .
In order to measure the action of a transformation τ , we
therefore use the distance in Eq. (1) –between the transfor-
mation and the identity transformation e, i.e., dI(e, τ). To
compare the effect of transformations on different images,
we normalize dI(e, τ) by the norm the image, that is
d˜I(e, τ) =
dI(e, τ)
‖I‖L2
. (2)
3. Robustness to geometric transformations
As we have now chosen our metric as (2), our approach
to measure robustness of classifiers can be formalized as
follows. Let k be the given classifier, I an image and T
the set of transformations we are interested in. As with [7],
we define the invariance metric as the minimal normalized
distance between the identity transformation and a transfor-
mation that leads to misclassification. Hence, the invariance
measure is denoted as
∆T (I, k) = min
τ∈T
d˜(e, τ) subject to k(I) 6= k(Iτ ), (3)
Note that this definition is similar to those used in works on
adversarial perturbations such as [18][9]. However, in our
case, instead of looking at minimal fooling additive pertur-
bations, we are interested in the minimal or worst-case ge-
ometric transformation. Thus, for a probability distribution
µ on the set of images, the global invariance score of the
classifier k to transformations in T is defined as
ρT (k) = EI∼µ∆T (I, k). (4)
As the underlying probability distribution of the images is
generally unknown, the invariance score of the classifier is
calculated using the empirical average of the estimated in-
variance over a set of images:
ρˆT (k) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
d˜Ij (e, τˆ). (5)
One can also define the invariance of a classifier to a
random transformation by again using the metric d˜(e, τ).
In this case, we use the probability of misclassification
of transformed images under random transformations with
given geodesic scores to measure the invariance. This can
be defined it as
rT (k) = min r s.t. P
I,τ
(k(Iτ ) 6= k(I) | dI(e, τ) = r) ≥ 0.5.
(6)
Note that 0.5 is chosen as a threshold here, but other thresh-
olds can be used for defining the invariance to random trans-
formations.
In practice, ρˆT (k) in (5) is computed using the algo-
rithm described in Section 4 to find a small transforma-
tion τˆ that can fool the image and using the geodesic dis-
tance of this transformation, d˜I(e, τˆ), to estimate ∆T (I, k).
The expectation can then be calculated using multiple im-
ages sampled from a dataset. On the other hand, the es-
timation of rT , rˆT (k), is computed by sampling the set
Mr =
{
Iτ : τ ∈ T , d˜I(e, τ) = r
}
for increasing r and
computing the misclassification percentage of the corre-
sponding transformed samples.
4. ManiFool
In this section, we first introduce the ManiFool algorithm
to find a small fooling transformation τˆ for binary and mul-
ticlass classifiers. We then present a method to measure the
geodesic distance d˜Ij (e, τˆ) to compute the invariance score
Figure 2: Illustration of Algorithm 1. Assume M is the mani-
fold of transformed images for the input x0 and B is the deci-
sion boundary of classifier f . The algorithm iteratively moves to-
wards the decision boundary. The first iteration is shown where
the movement direction u is found by projecting ∇f to the tan-
gential space of M and the next image x1 is found by mapping u
back onto the manifold
in (5). The main idea of the ManiFool algorithm is simply
to iteratively move from an image sample towards the deci-
sion boundary of the classifier where the classification deci-
sion changes, while staying on the transformation manifold.
Each iteration is then composed of two steps: choosing the
movement direction and mapping this movement onto the
manifold. The iterations will continue until the algorithm
reaches the decision boundary and finds a fooling transfor-
mation example. An illustration of the algorithm can be
found in Figure 2 and a more detailed description of the al-
gorithm is given in the following section.
4.1. ManiFool for binary classifiers
Since a multiclass classifier can be thought as a com-
bination of multiple binary classifiers, we first start from
the binary classifier case. We consider from now on dis-
crete versions of images, denoted as x ∈ Rn where n is
the number of pixels of x. The binary classifier is defined
as k(x) = sign(f(x)), where f : Rn → R is an arbitrary
differentiable classification function. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume that the original label of the image is
1.
Let x(i) be the image at the start of iteration i and let
iterations start with i = 0. The first step for any iteration
consists in finding the movement direction. Since we as-
sumed that the original label is 1, f(x(0)) > 0 for the input
image x(0). Thus, to reach the decision boundary where
f(x) = 0 while following the shortest path, we need to
choose the direction which maximally reduces f(x), which
is the opposite of the gradient of f , −∇f(x). However,
since we want to stay on the set of transformed images,
we restrict the classifier to the image appearance manifold,
Algorithm 1 ManiFool for binary classifiers
Input: Image x, classifier f
Output: Transformation τˆ
1: Initialize with x(0) ← x, i← 0.
2: while f(x(i)) > 0 do
3: uˆ← −J+
x(i)
∇f(x(i))
4: u(i) ← λi uˆ‖uˆln‖ + γu
(i−1)
5: τi ← exp
(∑
j ujGj
)
6: x(i+1) ← x(i)τi
7: i← i+ 1
8: end while
9: return τˆ = τ0 ◦ τ1 ◦ . . . τi
M(x), as f|M : M(x) → R, and use its gradient ∇f|M.
At point x(i), this gradient can be acquired simply by pro-
jecting ∇f(x(i)) onto the tangent space of x(i), Tx(i)M
[1]. This projection is done using the pseudoinverse opera-
tor as
u = −J+
x(i)
∇f(x(i)) = −(JTx(i)Jx(i))−1JTx(i)∇f(x(i)).
(7)
where Jx(i) is the Jacobian matrix, whose columns form
the basis of the tangential space and u ∈ Tx(i)M is the
projection of∇f(x(i)), i.e., our movement direction for this
iteration.
After finding the movement direction, the next step is
to map u onto M(x). This step depends heavily on the
transformation set. As we want to minimize the geodesic
distance, the natural choice of mapping would be to use the
exponential map for M(x) since it follows the geodesics
[26]. If an exponential map is readily available for M
and does not have high computational complexity, it can
be used. However, for most transformation sets, this does
not hold and a retraction is used instead. Here, we will talk
about one such retraction for the set of projective transfor-
mations and its subsets. Different retractions can be defined
for other Lie groups.
The retraction in our implementation uses the matrix rep-
resentation of projective transformations, where the matrix
exponential forms a map from Te T to T . Let y ∈ M(x),
u ∈ TyM(x) and Gi be the basis of Te T , which are also
called the generators of T . The retraction we use can be
summarized as mapping u to Te T by using the generators,
then mapping it to the matrix Lie group T and lastly, map-
ping it back to M(x) by using ψx(i) . More formally, the
retraction at the point y, Ry : TyM→M can be written
as
Ry(u) = ψ
(y)
exp
∑
j
ujGj
 . (8)
The image for the next iteration of the algorithm is thus
written as
x(i+1) = Rx(i)(u) = x
(i)
τi , (9)
where τi is the transformation represented by
τi = exp
∑
j
ujGj
 . (10)
Lastly, the label of the generated image is checked. If
k(x(i+1)) = 1, the algorithm continues with the next iter-
ation, this time starting from x(i+1). Otherwise, the algo-
rithm has finished successfully and the transformation that
generated x(i+1) is found as
τˆ = τ0 ◦ τ1 ◦ . . . τi. (11)
The algorithm is summarized on Algorithm 1. Over-
all, it should be noted that our algorithm is closely related
to manifold optimization techniques, particularly to line-
search methods. The convergence analysis of such methods
can be found for example in [1]. Using this analogy, choos-
ing the movement direction has changed by including line-
search and momentum terms, since it has been seen empiri-
cally that they improve the accuracy and reduce the chance
of converging to a local minimum. This new direction term
can be written as
u(i) = −λi
J+
x(i)
∇f(x(i))
‖J+
x(i)
∇f(x(i))‖ + γu
(i−1), (12)
where λi is a step size term that is chosen to maximize the
decrease in f in each step and γ is the constant momentum
parameter.
4.2. ManiFool for multiclass classifiers
The most common scheme used in multiclass classifiers
is one-vs-all, which serves as a basis for our method. In this
scheme, the classifier function has c outputs where c is the
number classes. Thus, the function is defined as f : Rn →
Rc and the classification is performed as:
k(x) = arg max
k
fk(x), (13)
where fk is the output of f that corresponds to the kth class.
Let lx = k(x(0)), where x(0) is the input image to the algo-
rithm. Then we can define c−1 binary classifiers for l 6= lx
as:
gl(x) = flx(x)− fl(x). (14)
Since lx = arg maxk fk(x(0)), flx(x
(0)) > fl(x
(0)) for
all l 6= lx and thus gl(x(0)) > 0.
As we now have c−1 binary classifiers, we can get c−1
examples of fooling transformations by using each binary
classifier as input to the binary ManiFool from Algorithm
1. When the algorithm is used with gl, it stops iterating
Algorithm 2 ManiFool for multiclass classifiers
Input: Image x, classifier f
Output: Transformation τˆ
1: Initialize with x(0) ← x, lx ← k(x(0)).
2: for l 6= lx do
3: gl ← flx − fl
4: i← 0
5: while k(x(i)) = lx do
6: uˆ← −J+
x(i)
∇gl(x(i))
7: u(i) ← λi uˆ‖uˆln‖ + γu
(i−1)
8: τi ← exp
(∑
j ujGj
)
9: x(i+1) ← x(i)τi
10: i← i+ 1
11: end while
12: τˆl ← τ0 ◦ τ1 ◦ . . . τi
13: end for
14: lmin ← arg minl 6=lx d˜(e, τl)
15: return τˆ = τlmin
when k(x(i)) 6= lx, instead of stopping when gl(x(i)) < 0,
because the classifier we are trying to fool is k, and not gl.
Let τl be the output transformation when gl is used as the
input to the binary ManiFool. As we now have a fooling
transformation example for each class, the class with the
smallest transformation by using the geodesic score from
(2) can be chosen as
lmin = arg min
l 6=lx
d˜x(0)(e, τl), (15)
and the algorithm will output the corresponding transforma-
tion, τlmin .
The complexity of the algorithm depends on multiple
factors, including the properties of the input classifier, input
image and parameters such as γ. For example, as a separate
single target ManiFool is run for each output class, the com-
plexity depends heavily on c, the number of classes. Thus,
to reduce complexity, only the most probable cˆ classes are
used in the algorithm, which are the cˆ classes with highest
fl(x0) excluding lx. The complexity is also highly depen-
dent on the number of iterations Nit for each single target
ManiFool. Although these cannot be known exactly before
running the algorithm, they are bounded by the maximum
number of iterations Nmax. Thus, the complexity increases
linearly with Nmax, which should be chosen carefully in
order not to unnecessarily increase the complexity.
4.3. Measuring robustness to geometric transfor-
mations
Although we have utilized geodesic distance dx(e, τ)
in the above methods, we have not shown how it can be
computed. One possible method is to use Fast March-
Figure 3: Illustration of the distance measurement. Assume M
be a manifold and p0, p1 ∈ M. We estimate the geodesic dis-
tance between these points using the direct path, by first map-
ping p1 to the tangential space of p0 as v1 vector, dividing v1
into smaller vectors and remapping these back onto the manifold.
Then, dˆ(p0, p1) from (17) is given by the sum of distances between
these points, as the length of the grey curve.
ing Method (FMM), which progressively calculates the dis-
tance of points on a grid on the manifold from a refer-
ence point [21]. However, the complexity of this algorithm
increases exponentially with the manifold dimension, and
may rapidly become too complex. Thus, we propose a dif-
ferent method, by assuming that the geodesic path to the
target node is direct, and we estimate the geodesic distance
using this direct path. Let p0, p1 ∈ M, and v1 = R−1p0 (p1)
where R is a retraction. Then, the direct path from p0 to p1
can be defined as
γ(t) = Rp0(tv1), t ∈ [0, 1]. (16)
For a chosen step-size η, v1 can be divided into parts as
vˆ = η v1‖v1‖ . Then for N = b
‖v1‖
η c, the distance can be
estimated as
dˆ(p0, p1) =
N∑
i=1
‖R(ivˆ)−R((i−1)vˆ)‖L2+‖p1−R(Nvˆ)‖L2 ,
(17)
which is the sum of L2 distances on the sampled direct path.
An illustration is given on Figure 3. In our case, we estimate
dx(e, τ) as dˆ(x,xτ ), since from (1), the distance between
the transformations on T is equal to the distance between
their transformed counterparts.
5. Experimental Results
We now test our algorithm on convolutional neural net-
work architectures. In these experiments, the invariance
score for minimal transformations, defined in (5), is cal-
culated by finding fooling transformation examples using
ManiFool for a set of images, and computing the average
of the geodesic distance of these examples. On the other
hand, to calculate the invariance against random transfor-
mations, we generate a number of random transformations
9 5 6 4 4 7 2 9 2 7
7292704657
(a) Translations
3 7 2 8 6 7 9 5 7 3
3 7 2 8 6 9 9 2 7 3
(b) Similarity transformations
Figure 4: Examples of MNIST images transformed using outputs of ManiFool and Manitest [7] for translation and similarity sets. Top
rows show the original images, the middle rows show the outputs from ManiFool and the bottom row shows the output of Manitest. The
red numbers indicate the new output labels of the transformed images.
with a given geodesic distance r for each image in a set and
calculate the misclassification rate2 of the network for the
transformed images. A random transformation is created by
sampling the unit sphere of Te T and increasing the magni-
tude of this vector until the corresponding transformation
has score equal to r, i.e., d(e,R(αv)) = r where v ∈ Te T
is the sampled vector with ‖v‖ = 1 and α > 0 is a scal-
ing factor. A more detailed explanation of how the random
transformation is sampled can be found in supp. material.
The misclassification rate is calculated for different r to see
the performance of the network on different levels of per-
turbation and to get rˆT from (6). In every case, the discrete
images after transformation are obtained using bilinear in-
terpolation; they further have the same size as the original
image with zero-padding boundary conditions when neces-
sary.
5.1. Performance of ManiFool
The first experiment compares the ManiFool algorithm
with Manitest [7], to evaluate the performance of the algo-
rithm in terms of speed and accuracy. For this comparison,
on top of calculating the invariance score using ManiFool
with Nmax = 50, we also do the same thing with Man-
itest, i.e., we use it to find fooling transformation examples
for the set of images and use these transformations to mea-
sure invariance. The comparison is done using 1000 images
from the MNIST [16] training dataset and a baseline CNN
with two 5 × 5 layers with 32 and 64 feature maps respec-
tively with ReLU nonlinearity and 2 × 2 max pooling. In
both cases, the geodesic distance is calculated using (17) to
be comparable. Some of the transformed images generated
during the experiment can be seen in Figure 4 and Table
1 reports the invariance score ρˆT and the running time for
both methods.
Manitest uses the fast marching method to find the trans-
formation that changes the label. This requires measuring
the distance of all the transformed images on a grid over
parameters and evaluate the classifier until it reaches a fool-
ing transformation. Thus, it is guaranteed to find the mini-
2As we consider the invariance of a network, we define misclassifica-
tion as a change in label, i.e., if k(x) 6= k(xτ ) for the transformed image
xτ
ManiFool Manitest
Transformation ρˆT time ρˆT time
T (d = 2) 1.68 2.6 s 1.54 2.7 s
R+T (d = 3) 1.40 3.6 s 1.33 23.9 s
S+T (d = 3) 1.41 6.2 s 1.32 34.6 s
T+R+S (d = 4) 1.26 3.1 s 1.25 29.5 s
Table 1: Comparison of Manitest and ManiFool for different trans-
formation sets on MNIST dataset. In the table, T, R and S stand for
translation, rotation and scaling respectively; while d represents
the number of dimensions of the transformation groups. The time
column lists the average time required to compute one sample. The
experiment was done using a baseline CNN with 2 convolutional
layers. These times are computed on a server with 2 Intel Xeon
CPU E5-2680 v3 without GPU support.
mal transformation in the discretized search space and it is
more accurate than ManiFool in this regard. However, as
it can be seen on Table 1, it is more complex than Man-
iFool, especially as the dimension of the manifold is in-
creased. Thus, it is not scalable for high dimensional man-
ifolds. On the other hand, while not being as accurate,
ManiFool is less complex in these situations. For exam-
ple, Table 1 shows that the complexity of ManiFool does
not closely depend on the dimensionality ofM(x). Thus,
ManiFool can be used for measuring the invariance of more
complex networks such as the state-of-the-art architectures
used with ImageNet database. Because of this, we have
only used ManiFool to compare networks in the following
experiments.
5.2. Invariance score of different architectures
The second experiment uses ManiFool to quantitatively
compare the invariance properties of different networks.
For this purpose, we have computed the invariance score of
AlexNet [15], ResNet [11] and VGG [23] pre-trained mod-
els, using 5000 random images from ILSVRC2012 valida-
tion dataset [19]. Some examples that are created during
this experiment can be seen on Figure 5, which shows that
these networks are quite vulnerable against geometric trans-
formations. In addition, we also compute the invariance of
these networks to random transformations for r ∈ [0, 10]
using 5000 images from ILSVRC2012 validation dataset
Trombone Flower pot
WokSafety pinArctic foxNecklace
Christmas stocking Ice bear Soccer ball Carton
File cabinetSnail
Similarity Affine Projective
Figure 5: Examples of ILSVRC2012 images transformed using outputs of ManiFool using ResNet18 for similarity, affine and projective
sets.Top row shows the original image while the bottom row shows the transformed image. The texts bottom show the output labels of the
images at top and bottom respectively. More examples are found in supp. material.
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Figure 6: Misclassification rates of different networks with respect to the geodesic score of the transformation of the input images. The
rates are calculated using 5000 images from ILSVRC2012 validation dataset with 10 different transformations for each image.
with 10 random transformations each. The misclassifica-
tion rates of the networks for each tested r is seen on Figure
6. Figure 7 reports the invariance scores for all of the net-
works. It can be seen that, for the same type of networks
(e.g., VGGs and ResNets), the invariance increases with the
number of layers in each set of transformations. This re-
sult is in agreement with the previous empirical studies on
smaller datasets such as [9, 7], but we have shown here that
this also holds for deeper, more complex networks. On top
of this, we can also see that neither the number of parame-
ters nor the depth of the networks are the only decisive fac-
tors: ResNet-18 is less invariant than VGG-16, even though
it is deeper and VGG-16 has more parameters than ResNet-
50, yet it is less invariant. Similar results can be observed
for the invariance to random transformations, e.g., the in-
variance again increases with depth. In fact, Figure 7 shows
that there certainly is a correlation between these two in-
variance values. However, interestingly, the ordering is not
exactly the same as can be seen on Figure 6. For example,
Original Minimal Random Baseline
ρˆT 1.13 1.78 1.55 1.10
Table 2: The invariance to affine transformations of ResNet18 on
CIFAR10 before and after the first epoch of fine tuning. Invari-
ance score is calculated using 5000 images from CIFAR10 test
set. ’Minimal’, ’Random’ and ’Baseline’ stand for the extra epoch
done using the transformed dataset created using ManiFool, the
dataset created using random transformations and the training set
respectively.
ResNet-34 and ResNet-50 perform better against random
transformations compared to VGG networks.
5.3. Adversarial Training using ManiFool
As our last experiment, we have fine-tuned a network
for CIFAR10 [14] classification by performing 5 additional
epochs with a 50% decreased learning rate using images
that were transformed by label changing affine transforma-
tions generated using ManiFool. To be complete, we also
performed 5 extra epochs using the original data and 5 ex-
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Figure 7: Invariance scores of different networks against similarity and affine transformations. For ρˆT , the invariance scores are calculated
using 5000 images from ILSVRC2012 validation dataset and for rˆT , they are calculated again using 5000 images with 10 different
transformations for each image.
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Figure 8: Misclassification rate of ResNet18 on CIFAR10 before
and after fine tuning using adversarial geometric transformations
with respect to the geodesic score of the random affine transfor-
mations of the input images. The rates are calculated using 5000
images from the test set with 20 transformations for each image.
tra epochs using randomly transformed images. For these
randomly transformed images, the score of the transfor-
mations were equal to the median geodesic score of the
dataset generated with ManiFool. We used ResNet-18 for
this experiment, which was trained using stochastic gradi-
ent descent with softmax loss. The invariance score against
minimal transformations, ρˆT is then calculated for the net-
works after each epoch using 5000 images from CIFAR-
10 test set. To see the effect of fine tuning on the invari-
ance against random transformations, we also computed
the misclassification rate for a transformation distance of
r ∈ [0, 5] using 5000 images from CIFAR10 test set with
20 transformations each. The results of these experiments
are seen on Figure 8 and Table 2. It can be observed in
Table 2 that fine tuning with adversarial examples has in-
creased the invariance score significantly, even after only
one extra epoch. This is in line with previous works on ad-
ditive adversarial perturbations, where adversarial training
was shown to improve robustness against the examined ad-
ditive perturbation[10][18], but this effect is now seen for
transformations as well. We can also see that its effect
is greater than using only randomly transformed images.
More interestingly, we can also see in Figure 8 that fine
tuning using the worst-case examples has increased the ro-
bustness against random transformations considerably. For
example, for random transformations with d˜(e, τl) = 2.5,
the misclassification rate has decreased more than 20% after
fine tuning. Although there is also a small penalty in accu-
racy of the network (0.6% reduction on test set), this shows
that choosing the worst-case transformation examples for
fine tuning can increase invariance in both worst-case and
random regimes.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a new constructive
framework for computing the invariance score of deep im-
age classifiers against geometric transformations. We pro-
posed an algorithm, ManiFool, for finding small fooling
transformation examples. The simple idea behind it is
to perform gradient descent on the manifold of geometric
transformations, in other words, it iteratively moves towards
the class decision boundary while staying on the manifold
to generate adversarial examples. Using this method, we
have studied the robustness of networks trained on Ima-
geNet against worst-case and random transformations. We
also showed that adversarial training using ManiFool can
be used as a way to improve the robustness of deep net-
works against both worst-case and random transformations
and leads to more invariant networks. In the future, we
believe this process can be used for empirical analysis of
neural networks under geometric transformations and thus
provide a better understanding of invariance to non-additive
perturbations and the properties of different network archi-
tectures. Also, the ManiFool algorithm can be useful for
generating new and practically relevant types of adversarial
examples by using wider types of natural transformations.
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